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U.S. inflation 
and real economic 
activity became more 
difficult to forecast 
during the 
Great Moderation.
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by Mark A. Wynne and Patrick Roy
Monetary policy affects real economic activity and the price level with 
long and variable lags. Consequently, forecasts of inflation and real economic 
activity are key inputs to central banks’ decisionmaking. 
research and experience have shown, however, that forecasting is 
fraught with difficulty. rarely, if ever, do forecasts turn out exactly correct. errors 
occur because of our limited understanding of modern economies, our inability 
to anticipate the shocks that regularly buffet the economy and our failure to 
fully anticipate ongoing structural changes. 
evidence suggests that U.s. inflation and real economic activity be-
came more difficult to forecast during the Great Moderation, the two-decade 
period of relatively mild inflation and stable growth that preceded the current 
financial crisis.1  EconomicLetter  Federal reserve Bank oF dallas 2   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas  EconomicLetter
Even for advanced 
 economies, estimates 
of slack are subject to 
considerable uncertainty.
The explanation often centers on 
improved monetary policy. With cen-
tral banks more focused on price sta-
bility, the predictive power has ebbed 
for such indicators of inflation pres-
sures as capacity utilization, unemploy-
ment rates or output gaps. In the past, 
central banks might have allowed price 
pressures generated by tighter labor 
or product markets to be transmitted 
to higher inflation. Today, they adjust 
policies in response to these pressures, 
preventing a move to higher inflation.
We investigate an alternative 
possibility—that the decline in the abil-
ity to forecast inflation may instead be 
due to greater globalization. As coun-
tries become more integrated through 
trade and financial flows, domestic 
inflation has a larger foreign compo-
nent that is determined by variables 
typically excluded from forecasts.
Forecasts Go Astray 
To measure the accuracy of infla-
tion forecasts, we compare annual 
forecasts since 1991, taken from 
the monthly publication Consensus 
Forecasts, with year-over-year changes 
in the U.S. Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). The forecast values are from 18 
months in advance. For the forecast of 
2008 inflation, for example, we use the 
projections made in June 2007.
In that survey, Consensus 
Forecasts participants projected a 2008 
inflation rate of 2.4 percent. The CPI 
actually increased 3.8 percent. Over 
the entire sample, actual inflation rare-
ly matches the rate forecast 18 months 
in advance. In the early 1990s, inflation 
was consistently below the Consensus 
Forecasts rates; after 2000, it was usu-
ally above the forecast rates (Chart 
1). Indeed, the mean absolute forecast 
error rose from 0.6 in the 1990s to 0.8 
in the 2000s, a noticeable increase in 
an already large number. 
Understanding this dismal track 
record starts with the Phillips curve—a 
well-documented, empirical relation-
ship between measures of slack in 
labor or product markets and inflation. 
Greater slack seems to be followed 
by lower inflation; tighter labor and 
product markets seem linked to higher 
inflation. 
Economists have long used 
Phillips curve-type relationships in 
making inflation forecasts.2 However, 
the relationship between slack mea-
sures and inflation seems to have 
changed over time. Specifically, infla-
tion seems less responsive to domestic 
slack in recent years. 
Some economists have argued that 
the reduced responsiveness reflects 
greater globalization. With the ability 
to source inputs from anywhere in the 
world, home market factors of produc-
tion matter less for domestic inflation. 
If we know that global slack is what 
matters for inflation determination, 
then surely doing a better job of fore-
casting inflation is simply a matter of 
replacing our conventional measures 
of domestic slack with measures of 
global slack. 
Unfortunately, things aren’t so 
simple. Measuring resource utilization 
or slack is a challenging task under 
the best of circumstances. Even for 
advanced economies—for which we 
have abundant and timely data on 
output, labor and capital—estimates 
of slack are subject to considerable 
uncertainty. 
If we try to measure these indica-
tors on a global scale, the problems of 
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Survey averages 
of forecasts 
tend to do a 
lot better than 
individual forecasts.
accurate measurement increase. Poor 
measurement of the key driving vari-
able of inflation might be expected to 
lead to a decline in our ability to fore-
cast inflation.3
Our objective is to ask whether 
there is any evidence that inflation has 
become more difficult to forecast as a 
result of globalization. 
Our primary data sources are 
the inflation forecasts reported each 
month by London-based Consensus 
Economics. Each month, it polls pro-
fessional forecasters at a variety of 
institutions for their latest forecasts for 
GDP growth, inflation and a variety 
of other macroeconomic indicators. 
Consensus publishes four surveys: 
Consensus Forecasts, Asia Pacific 
Consensus Forecasts, Latin American 
Consensus Forecasts and Eastern 
Europe Consensus Forecasts. 
In all cases, forecasts are reported 
in terms of year-over-year average 
changes.4 The list of countries covered 
by each publication has evolved over 
time. We chose to focus on 26 coun-
tries for which forecasts were avail-
able in 1991 to ensure a broad sample 
(Table 1).
In examining globalization’s role 
in the deterioration of our ability to 
accurately forecast inflation, using 
survey-based forecasts is something 
of a departure from standard practice. 
Most of the existing work in this area 
has looked at econometric models of 
varying degrees of complexity, often 
gauging their inflation-forecasting 
performance relative to simple, naïve 
benchmarks.
When it comes to forecasting 
inflation, however, evidence suggests 
that survey averages of forecasts tend 
to do a lot better than individual fore-
casts.5 The exact reason for the superi-
or performance isn’t entirely clear, but 
it may be due to the greater diversity 
of models and data that go into survey 
forecasts.
Forecasting Inflation
We begin our analysis by look-
ing at the accuracy of the forecasts of 
year-over-year average annual inflation 
at a variety of horizons. We define 
the forecast horizon as the number of 
months between the date of the partic-
ular issue of Consensus Forecasts and 
December of the year being forecast. 
The nine-month forecast for infla-
tion in 2008 is reported in the March 
2008 Consensus Forecasts. Each issue 
of Consensus Forecasts includes fore-
casts not only for the current year, but 
also for at least one future year. So the 
18-month forecast for 2009 inflation 
comes from the June 2008 issue.
For each country, we plot the 
forecast error for time horizons ranging 
from 23 to 0 months (Chart 2).6 The 
results show that inflation becomes 
a lot easier to forecast as one pro-
ceeds through the year: The forecast 
errors fall dramatically as we go from 
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Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 









Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Russia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
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Even at the 0-month horizon—that 
is, December of the year being fore-
cast—the forecast error is still positive, 
indicating at least some error remains. 
This isn’t as odd as it may seem. At 
the time December forecasts are made, 
analysts still don’t have complete 
information about price developments 
during the year. In most countries, the 
December CPI isn’t reported until the 
middle of January of the following year.
A number of other points are 
worth noting. First, the G-7 countries 
show about a 0.5 percentage point 
variation at the 23-month horizon and 
at 0 months as well (Chart 2A). While 
accuracy improves as we get closer to 
the end of the year being forecast, the 
gains are a lot smaller for the U.K. and 
Germany than for other G-7 countries. 
Second, smaller euro-area coun-
tries have greater variation in forecast 
accuracy at longer horizons, but that 
variation diminishes significantly as the 
forecast horizon shortens (Chart 2B). A 
similar pattern is evident among small-
er industrial countries (Chart 2C).
Finally, we find a huge varia-
tion in forecast accuracy among Asian 
countries (Chart 2D). At the longest 
Chart 2
Inflation Forecast Errors Decline at Shorter Horizons
A. G-7 Countries        B. Smaller Euro-Area Countries
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horizon, Asian forecast errors are high-
er than for all the G-7 countries. As 
the forecast horizon shrinks, accuracy 
increases until the range at 0 months 
converges with the G-7.
Plotting each country’s forecast 
error at the 18-month horizon against 
average real per capita GDP yields an 
inverse relationship, suggesting that 
inflation is harder to forecast in low-
income countries (Chart 3).
If we remove Hong Kong, an 
outlier, this proposition gains strength, 
with the sample correlation going from 
–0.32 to –0.58. One explanation would 
be that data used for forecasts are 
more readily available in high-income 
countries. Another possibility is that 
lower-income countries may be more 
susceptible to unexpected inflationary 
shocks.
For the rest of this article we will 
focus on the 18-month horizon. The 
choice isn’t entirely arbitrary because 
18 months reflects a consensus for the 
lags between monetary policy actions 
and their impact on the economy.7 
We can summarize how fore-
casting accuracy at this horizon has 
changed over time by plotting the 
forecast errors during the 1990s on the 
horizontal axis and those in the 2000s 
on the vertical axis (Chart 4). For 
points above the 45-degree line, the 
forecast errors increased between the 
1990s and the 2000s—that is, inflation 
became more difficult to forecast. For 
points below the 45-degree line, the 
forecast errors decreased—that is, infla-
tion became easier to forecast. 
Inflation has become easier to 
forecast over time for almost all the 
countries—in some cases by a sig-
nificant amount. The exceptions are 
the U.S., Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, 
Taiwan and Malaysia. 
Globalization and Inflation
To determine whether globaliza-
tion has contributed to changes in 
inflation predictability, we first look 
for evidence that inflation is more dif-
ficult to forecast in more globalized 
economies.
Chart 3
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Chart 4
Inflation Easier to Forecast Since 2000
Average forecast error 2000–07
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Measuring globalization is dif-
ficult. Ideally, we’d look at differences 
between prices in domestic and world 
markets. Isolated countries would 
tend to have large gaps. In more glo-
balized economies, foreign competi-
tion would bring domestic and inter-
national prices into closer alignment.
In practice, it’s virtually impos-
sible to obtain the data needed for a 
price-based measure of globalization. 
Instead, researchers typically rely on 
quantity-based measures to assess the 
extent of globalization. One of the 
common indicators of real (as opposed 
to financial) globalization is the ratio 
of international trade to GDP. Our first 
measure of each country’s openness 
uses the sum of nominal imports and 
exports relative to GDP, averaged over 
the sample period. 
A scatter plot of the 18-month 
forecast error and trade openness sug-
gests that inflation is harder to forecast 
in more-open economies, with a pair-
wise correlation of 0.47 (Chart 5).  
It’s hard to know how much 
weight to put on this finding. The 
relationship is driven by two outliers, 
Hong Kong and Singapore, both very 
open economies by almost any mea-
sure. If we drop them, the correlation 
falls to 0.25. 
What about more financially glo-
balized economies? Measuring financial 
openness as the ratio of foreign assets 
and liabilities to GDP, we see a posi-
tive correlation at the 18-month hori-
zon, with a correlation of 0.38 (Chart 
6).8  Once again, globalization appears 
associated with greater difficulty in 
forecasting inflation.
Like the trade-based measure, the 
relationship for financial globalization 
seems heavily driven by outliers—in 
this case, Hong Kong and Ireland. 
Dropping them reduces the correla-
tion to –0.17. That is, if we omit the 
outliers, inflation appears to be easier 
to forecast in economies that are more 
financially globalized. 
Perhaps the story of globalization 
is fundamentally one of change rather 
than a steady exposure to international 
Chart 5
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Chart 6
Inflation Harder to Forecast in Financially Globalized 
Economies?
Forecast error



















SOURCES: Consensus Forecasts and Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts; Haver Analytics; financial globalization data from  
“The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970–2004,” 
by Philip R. Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper no. 126, 
March 2006.  EconomicLetter  Federal reserve Bank oF dallas   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas  EconomicLetter 7
developments. Even with a constant 
overall level of trade flows, a change 
in the composition of imports and 
exports may make it more difficult to 
forecast inflation. 
To see how trade composition 
relates to the decline in the ability to 
forecast inflation, we used data on 
bilateral flows of imports and exports 
to construct a simple measure of 
how each country’s trading patterns 
changed between the 1990s and the 
2000s.9 
We see a positive correlation 
with the forecast errors, with outliers 
still important but not as influential as 
they were for the other two measures 
of globalization (Chart 7). Dropping 
Hong Kong and Korea, the correlation 
falls from 0.41 to 0.35.
The Challenge Ahead
The structural change that poses a 
perennial challenge to forecasters has 
been turbocharged with the integra-
tion of China, India and other emerg-
ing giants into the global economy. 
We asked whether this surge in glo-
balization over the past two decades 
has made it more difficult to forecast 
inflation. 
We addressed the question from 
two angles. First, we looked for evi-
dence of deterioration in our ability 
to forecast inflation as countries have 
become more integrated with each 
other. Second, we looked for evi-
dence that forecast errors were greater 
on average in countries that rank 
higher on conventional globalization 
indicators.
U.S. inflation does appear to 
have become more difficult to forecast 
as we moved from the 1990s to the 
2000s; however, the opposite seems 
true in almost every other country 
we looked at. Our prior belief, based 
on U.S. experience, that globalization 
has made inflation harder to forecast 
doesn’t appear to be borne out. 
Nevertheless, we do find some 
evidence of greater difficulty in fore-
casting inflation in economies that are 
more open to international develop-
ments, although the relationships seem 
heavily influenced by outliers.
The relationships documented 
here are worthy of further research. 
Given the importance some explana-
tions of the decline in inflation pre-
dictability attach to better monetary 
policy, it would be interesting to 
try controlling for monetary policy 
regime—specifically, the introduction 
of inflation targeting or the presence of 
currency board arrangements or cur-
rency unions. 
It would also be interesting to 
extend the sample period back in time. 
China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization in 2001 was pivotal to 
globalization in the recent decade, but 
some would argue that the fundamen-
tal forces have been in place a lot lon-
ger. Perhaps since the start of Chinese 
policy reforms of 1978. Perhaps since 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. A 
longer-term perspective might better 
identify the effects of globalization on 
the predictability of inflation. 
Chart 7
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U.S. inflation does 
appear to have become 
more difficult to forecast 
 as we moved from the 
1990s to the 2000s; 
however, the opposite 
seems true in almost 
every other country we 
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Notes
1 Specifically, D’Agostino, Giannone and Surico 
document a decline in the ability to forecast 
inflation and real economic activity in the U.S. 
associated with the Great Moderation. They 
show that since the mid-1980s, the forecast 
performance of the Green Book and the Survey 
of Professional Forecasters has declined relative 
to naïve, random-walk forecasting models. See 
“(Un)predictability and Macroeconomic Stability,” 
by Antonello D’Agostino, Domenico Giannone 
and Paolo Surico, ECB Working Paper Series no. 
605, April 2006. Stock and Watson have looked 
for relationships that provide the best forecasts 
of inflation and examined the factors that underlie 
the instability of these forecasting relationships. 
See “Forecasting Inflation,” by James H. Stock 
and Mark W. Watson, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, vol. 44, no. 2, 1999, pp. 293–335; 
“Why Has U.S. Inflation Become Harder to Fore-
cast?” by James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 39, 
supplement, 2007, pp. 3–33; and “Phillips Curve 
Inflation Forecasts,” by James H. Stock and Mark 
W. Watson, unpublished paper, 2008.
2 For example, see note 1, Stock and Watson 
(2008).
3 The difficulties associated with measuring 
global output gaps are discussed in “Obstacles 
to Measuring Global Output Gaps,” by Mark 
A. Wynne and Genevieve R. Solomon, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Letter, no. 3, 
March 2007.
4 For a subset of the more advanced countries, 
each quarter Consensus Economics also reports 
forecasts of four-quarter changes in GDP, 
consumer spending and consumer prices at a 
quarterly frequency. Unfortunately these data are 
not included in the historical archive that we use 
for this study.
5 See, for example, “Do Macro Variables, Asset 
Markets, or Surveys Forecast Inflation Better?” 
by Andrew Ang, Geert Bekaert and Min Wei, Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, vol. 54, no. 4, 2007, 
pp. 1163–1212.
6 A commonly used measure of forecast accu-
racy, the RMSFE penalizes equally forecasts that 
are too high and too low.  It also imposes greater 
penalties on forecasts that are far from the actual 
outcome. The RMSFE is formally defined as the 
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where πt is actual inflation at period t and πt
f is 
the inflation forecasted for period t as of some 
earlier period.
7 A 12-month horizon was also tested, yielding 
very similar results.  
8 The asset and liability data come from “The 
External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and 
Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Li-
abilities, 1970–2004,” by Philip R. Lane and Gian 
Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Institute for International 
Integration Studies Discussion Paper no. 126, 
March 2006.
9 Let sijt denote the share of country i’s overall 
trade that is conducted with country j at date t, as 
measured either by the share of country i imports 
that come from country j at date t, or the share of 
total trade (imports plus exports) of country i that 
is with country j at date t. Using data from the 
International Monetary Fund’s annual Direction 
of Trade database, we measure the change in the 
composition of country i trade between dates t0 
and t1  as
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